Wayzata World Factbook 1996/The World Factbook - 1996 Edition - Wayzata Technology (3079) (1996).iso/mac/TEXT/HUMANrts/NIGERIA.TXT

Text File | 1996-01-05 | 28KB | 522 lines

TITLE:  NIGERIA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE:  FEBRUARY 1995

                          NIGERIA


General Sani Abacha, who seized power in a palace coup on
November 17, 1993, remained Head of State throughout 1994.
Under Abacha, the main decisionmaking organ is the
military-dominated Provisional Ruling Council (PRC), which
rules by decree.  The PRC oversees the 32-member Federal
Executive Council composed of some of Nigeria's most prominent
politicians.  Like previous military regimes, Abacha and the
PRC claimed they would eventually hand over power to a civilian
government, but the PRC did not reveal a timetable, although it
initiated a "constitutional conference" over which it had
strong influence.  Pending a new constitution, some provisions
of the 1979 Constitution were observed, although the decree
suspending it was not repealed.  The regime failed to clarify,
however, which aspects of the Constitution remained in effect.
Although the regime occasionally made reference to rights or
guarantees outlined in the Constitution to suit a particular
purpose, it just as often reminded the public of the continued
suspension of constitutional rights.

Despite several positive initial steps, the PRC showed little
respect for human rights after its first month in power, and
the political and economic climate steadily deteriorated
throughout 1994.  New political forces steadily gathered in
support of Chief Moshood K. O. Abiola, who on June 12, l993,
had won the presidential election, in what national and
international observers characterized as the most free and fair
election in Nigeria's history, but which was quickly annulled
by then military head, General Ibrahim Babangida.  In
particular, opposition figures united in a new organization
called the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), which
campaigned for an immediate return to civilian rule through a
"sovereign" national conference.  Abiola declared himself
President of Nigeria on June 11, 1994.

The Government continued to enforce its authority through the
Federal Security System (the military, the state security
service, and the national police--all of whom were responsible
for serious human rights abuses) and through decrees blocking
action by the opposition in the courts.  Starting in May and
June, the Government cracked down hard on the opposition,
arresting NADECO members.  With Abiola in prison awaiting
trial, General Abacha convened a constitutional conference, but
the labor movement, led by the National Union of Petroleum and
Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the National Labor Congress
(NLC), responded with massive strike action, demanding that
General Abacha release Abiola and hand over power to a civilian
government.  The ensuing strikes brought economic life in Lagos
and much of the southwest to a standstill for almost 8 weeks.

By the middle of September, the military Government became
increasingly confident, escalating further the crackdown on its
opponents.  In the face of the Government's tough actions, most
striking workers, fearing arrest and dismissal, soon returned
to work, and most of the fight went out of organized labor.  At
the end of the year, the economy continued its downward slide.
While Nigerian elites continued to prosper, unemployment,
underemployment, and inflation increased markedly.  Nigeria
depends on oil exports for over 90 percent of its foreign
exchange earnings and 75 percent of its budget revenues.  In
order to cope with reduced oil revenues, Nigeria implemented an
indigenous structural adjustment program (SAP) from 1986 to
1991.  While the SAP was a success in some respects, economic
conditions for the average Nigerian remained very difficult,
and successive military governments increasingly abandoned
reform by printing money that fueled inflation.

Nigeria's human rights record remained dismal in 1994.  General
Abacha's policies heightened episodic civil unrest in urban
areas.  Security forces used excessive force to control the
situation, killing and wounding a number of persons, including
peaceful protesters.  The Abacha Government regularly relied on
arbitrary detention and mass arrest as a means of silencing its
many critics.  To consolidate its hold on power, the regime in
August announced a series of harsh decrees restricting press
freedom and civil liberties which, like other military decrees,
contained clauses prohibiting judicial review of any government
action.  Security services stepped up routine harassment of
human rights and prodemocracy groups, including labor leaders,
journalists, and student activists.

Other human rights problems throughout the year included
extrajudicial killings; police torture; dangerous and
unsanitary prison conditions with many deaths; violence and
discrimination against women; and infringements on freedom of
speech, press, travel, and political and labor affiliation.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

As in previous years, police and security services commonly
engaged in extrajudicial killings and excessive use of force to
quell antimilitary and prodemocracy protests.  The most deadly
incidents occurred in July and August after the Government
deployed police and military units to put down protests in
Lagos and other cities in the southwest.  There were credible
reports that security forces may have killed from 20 to 50
people in the Lagos area alone.  Government reports of deaths
resulting from the riots were much lower, and the Government
asserted that security forces intervened only when confronted
by violent criminals.  While the victims included hoodlums and
looters, who used the protests as cover to engage in violent
criminal activities, eyewitness accounts indicated that
security forces often fired randomly into crowds, killing
innocent bystanders and peaceful demonstrators.

Nigerian human rights groups maintain that scores of people die
annually while in police custody, though there are no
definitive statistics, and the claims are difficult to
substantiate.  They are, however, accepted by the Nigerian
public and remain consistent with other credible reports of
police abuse, including the use of torture to extract
confessions.  The Civil Liberties Organization (CLO), a
nongovernmental organization (NGO), publicized the case of
Anthony Imo, who died while in police custody in February.
Police arrested Imo, a "patent medicine" seller, in Kano and
accused him of selling fake pharmaceuticals.  Reportedly
tortured by police while in custody for several hours, Imo was
taken by police to a local hospital where he later died,
apparently from brain damage.

The Government seldom holds police and security services
accountable for the use of excessive, deadly force or the death
of individuals while in custody; it made no effort to
investigate the conduct of security forces during the July and
August prodemocracy protests and denied that protesters died at
the hands of government forces.  The Government has thus
fostered a climate of impunity in which these abuses flourish.

According to the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights
(CDHR) and the CLO, in January a police patrol in Delta state
shot seven men they suspected of being armed robbers.  The
police maintain the seven fired upon them while trying to run a
checkpoint near Warri.  In an exchange of fire, the police shot
two of the men and arrested the rest of the party.  The police
then reportedly executed all seven prisoners soon after,
including a 70-year-old man.

Extrajudicial killing remained common in eastern Nigeria,
particularly as conflict between members of the Movement for
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and government forces
escalated throughout the year.  In April, spurred by increased
violence in the oil-producing area, the Government deployed
large numbers of police and military to Ogoniland.  Credible
reports of increased killings and beatings at police
checkpoints and other areas accompanied the deployment.  To
quell the upsurge of violence in the area, the military
administration of Rivers state promulgated a draconian decree
imposing the death sentence for "civil disturbances occasioning
death," and also for crimes such as "attempted murder."  The
administration set up a special court, the Civil Disturbances
Tribunal, to try such cases.

Human rights groups and the press corroborated MOSOP claims
that hundreds of people died in the violence which continued
unabated despite the military presence and the actions of the
Rivers state government.  The commander of the military forces
in Ogoniland, Major Paul Okuntimo, admitted publicly his forces
killed six people from June to August, stating that two were
shot when they fired on soldiers, one while trying to escape
from detention, and "the remaining three...as a deterrent to
their like."

     b.  Disappearance

There were no reports of politically motivated disappearances;
however, government detention practices have the effect of
causing many detainees to be "missing" for extended periods
(see Section 1.d.).

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
         Treatment or Punishment

The 1979 Constitution (suspended) and the 1989 Constitution
(never implemented) prohibit torture and mistreatment of
prisoners and provide criminal sanctions for such excesses, and
the Evidence Act of 1960 prohibits the introduction of evidence
obtained through torture.  Nevertheless, detainees frequently
die while in custody (see Section 1.a.), and there were
credible reports that police seeking to extract confessions
regularly beat and torture suspects.  For example, reports
circulated in September that the military beat and nearly
tortured to death detained NADECO members.  Detainees are
regularly kept incommunicado for long periods of time (see
Section 1.d.).

In its early months in power, the Abacha regime formed the
Lagos State Environmental Task Force as part of its "war on
indiscipline and corruption."  Under the direct supervision of
the Lagos state administrator, Colonel Olagunsoye Oyinlola, the
Task Force grew increasingly brutal in its attempts to rid
Lagos of illegal street traders and mountains of garbage.  Task
Force soldiers routinely beat and arrested anyone they
perceived as being "undisciplined," usually unarmed market
women and traders, but also including jaywalkers, errant
drivers, children, and young traders who hawk goods on Lagos
streets.  The Constitutional Rights Project publicized the case
of one of its lawyers, Kolawole Olaniyan, who was beaten and
horsewhipped after protesting being pressed into a work gang by
Task Force soldiers on March 16.  Armed soldiers reportedly
stopped the bus in which he was commuting and forced the
occupants to clean up piles of refuse nearby.  Soldiers also
targeted young women in short skirts or trousers, humiliating
them and sometimes stripping them naked for wearing "immodest
clothing."  The Government neither acknowledged nor denied that
such practices occurred; the perpetrators went unpunished.

Conditions in Nigeria's prisons remain life threatening.  Lack
of potable water, sewage facilities, and medical supplies
contribute to deplorable sanitary conditions.  Disease runs
rampant in the cramped, poorly ventilated facilities.  Prison
inmates are seldom allowed outside their cells for recreation,
and many must provide their own food.  In those cases, only
those with money or whose relatives bring food regularly have
something to eat.  Poor inmates rely on handouts from others to
survive.  There are credible reports that prison officials and
police deny inmates food and medical treatment as a form of
punishment or to extort money from them.  For example, the
prison authorities denied Ken Saro-Wiwa, leader of MOSOP, who
suffers from a heart condition, access to medical care and food
appropriate to his medical condition during his detainment in
January and again during his subsequent detention, while
ignoring continued requests by Saro-Wiwa's personal physician
to see him (see Section 1.d.).  There were also credible
reports that prison officials kept Saro-Wiwa in chains for at
least part of his detention.

Severe overcrowding in Nigerian prisons remains a serious
problem.  For example, Ikoyi prison in Lagos, built to house
about 800 inmates, holds over 2,000.  The CDHR estimated that
2,000 people die each year in prisons from disease, although
the Government admits only to a much lower mortality rate.  A
correspondent for the Vanguard newspaper reported the death of
40 inmates from tuberculosis in the Warri federal prison since
the end of 1993.  The Ita Oko detention camp was most likely
reopened to ease the burden on other overcrowded facilities.

The Government derives considerable savings from the practice
of leaving many children born in prison with their jailed
mothers rather than placing them in foster homes.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, and Exile

The regime repeatedly engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention
(see below).  Police are empowered to make arrests without
warrants if there is reasonable suspicion of an offense and
often abuse this power.  Nigerian law requires the arresting
officer to inform the accused of charges at the time of arrest
and take him or her to the station for processing within a
reasonable time.  Suspects must be given the opportunity to
engage counsel and to post bail.  However, police do not
generally adhere to these safeguards.  They often hold suspects
incommunicado under harsh conditions for extended periods
without charge; arbitrary detention occurs frequently.  Police
also commonly place relatives and friends of wanted suspects in
detention without charge in an effort to induce the accused to
turn themselves in.

The State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree of 1984
(Decree Two) provides that the Government may detain without
charge persons suspected of acts prejudicial to state security
or harmful to the economic well-being of the country.  When
invoked by the Vice President, the decree suspends the
detainee's civil liberties and precludes judicial review.  Many
Nigerians still consider Decree Two the main threat to their
basic freedoms because the judicial ouster clause encourages
arbitrary detention and fails to define what constitutes acts
prejudicial to state security or the nation's economic
well-being.

During the year, the Government expanded its authority to
detain opponents by promulgating a series of new decrees.  One
of them, Decree 11, authorizes the PRC Vice Chairman or the
Commissioner of Police to detain persons for up to 3 months.
Another, Decree 14, forbids courts to order the Government to
produce prisoners in court, effectively suspending the right of
habeas corpus.  The PRC relied heavily on arbitrary arrest and
detention throughout the year in an effort to silence its
critics.  In February, after the Government announced a ban on
regional political organizations, security forces arrested and
detained without charge retired general and former presidential
candidate Shehu Musa Yar'Adua.  In March the Government cracked
down on human rights groups' activities throughout the nation.
The authorities arrested Femi Falana, chairman of the National
Association of Democratic Lawyers and two members of the
Campaign for Democracy (CD) in Lagos on March 11, but never
charged them.  Security operatives earlier in the month
arrested Oyo state chairman of the CD, Gbenga Awosode, and
Kwara state CDHR chairperson, Josephine Okei.  Security forces
broke up an antiwar rally organized by the CD on March 15 and
arrested and detained eight CD members, including Femi Falana
and founding member Frederick Fasehun.

In the wake of protests against the constitutional conference
in May and June, the Government expanded its crackdown,
arresting hundreds of prodemocracy agitators.  In the wave of
arrests, the Government detained and charged with treason
several former senators, who declared they had reconvened the
disbanded National Assembly, including Senate President Ameh
Ebute and Senators Bola Tinubu, Polycarp Nwite, N.A. Okorofor,
and Abu Ibrahim.  They were released on bail, but the charges
against them remained pending.  The authorities also arrested
and released Tokunbo Afikuyomi, member of the disbanded House
of Representatives and former aide to General Abacha's Minister
of Foreign Affairs Baba Gana Kingibe, and a number of NADECO
members, such as former governor of Plateau state Air Commodore
Dan Suleiman; former governor of Benue state Air Commodore
Jonah Jang; former governor of Anambra state C.C. Onoh; former
governor of Oyo state Bola Ige; and the highly respected
politician and statesman, Anthony Enahoro.  The authorities
detained human rights figures around the country, including CD
chairman and NADECO member Beko Ransome-Kuti, who went on a
hunger strike to protest the conditions of his detention.

The Government arrested on charges of treasonable offenses in
late June Chief Moshood K.O. Abiola, widely believed the winner
of the annulled June 12, 1993, elections, who declared himself
President and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of
Nigeria.  The Government kept Abiola in isolation for weeks
before moving him to Abuja and commencing his trial (see
Section 1.e.).  Credible reports emerged that Abiola had been
humiliated while in custody, and that his family and doctor
were only sporadically allowed access to him.  In September the
regime allowed Abiola's personal physician and other doctors to
examine him.  Despite the doctors' findings of a serious heart
condition, the regime refused pleas from his family and others
that he be released for urgent tests that could be performed
only in Lagos or abroad.

In August and September the regime continued to silence
opposition to its rule.  It arrested again Chief Anthony
Enahoro on August 18, jailing him in the Port Harcourt prison.
His family complained that security forces refused them access
to see him and that his doctor was unable to assess the
75-year-old Enahoro's medical condition.  Enahoro was released
without charge in late December after being moved to the Port
Harcourt military hospital.  Beko Ransome-Kuti was again
arrested without charge on September 15, after security
operatives entered the offices of the CDHR with a warrant and
seized a number of documents.  After holding Ransome-Kuti
incommunicado for 1 week, the Government charged him with
writing threatening letters to the managing directors of Agip
and Shell oil companies and released him on bail.  In early
November, the federal High Court in Lagos ruled that only the
federal Attorney General could prosecute cases of treasonable
felony, and that because the Government's case against
Ransome-Kuti had been filed at the state court level, it was
invalid.  The Government ignored the ruling, rearresting
Ransome-Kuti on November 9, this time also accusing him of
receiving 6 million Naira from Abiola to "bomb government
installations and strategic buildings."  The new Attorney
General of the Federation, Michael Agbamuche, defended the
Government's actions, saying that the Government had the right
to overturn judicial decisions "in certain circumstances."
Ransome-Kuti was released on bail soon after, and the case
continued at year's end.  Noted civil rights activist and
lawyer Gani Fawehinmi was arrested on October 1 after
announcing the formation of a new political party, the National
Conscience (NC).  He was released several days later.

Throughout the year, government forces harassed and detained
from time to time other members of MOSOP, including Ken
Saro-Wiwa's brother, Owens Wiwa.  Saro-Wiwa also remained in
prison at year's end, without access to a lawyer, his family or
a doctor.  In November the Government announced the formation
of a military tribunal to try Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP members
for complicity in the murders of four Ogoni chiefs (see Section
5).

The labor movement confirmed that the following labor leaders
were in detention at year's end:  Frank Kokori, General
Secretary of NUPENG; R. Addo, first president of the Petroleum
and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN); P.
Aidelomon, a PENGASSAN branch chairman; Wariebi Kojo Agamene,
president of NUPENG; and Olu Aderibegbe, Chairman of the Edo
state NLC.

The above cases were not isolated.  The Government routinely
detained human rights monitors, journalists (see Section 2.a.),
and political opponents throughout the year for making or
publishing statements critical of the Government.  Most often
the authorities did not charge the detainees with a crime, held
them for brief periods, and questioned them about their
activities and statements.  Nigeria's total prison population
is estimated at 65,000.  Human rights groups estimate that as
much as 46 percent of this population awaits trial.  A precise
figure for the number of persons detained without charge is
unavailable, and there are no credible estimates of the number
of political detainees.

There were no known instances of forced exile as a means of
political control, although several NADECO members were in
self-imposed exile in the United States and the United Kingdom
at year's end.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

In its efforts to suppress opposition to its rule, the regime
first bypasssed the regular courts in favor of "tribunals" and
then declared itself above the law by prohibiting court review
of any government action (see below).

Decree One of 1984, the Basic Constitution (Modification and
Suspension) Decree, the first decree promulgated by the
military officers who overthrew the civilian regime of
President Shagari in 1983, left the institutional framework of
the judiciary relatively intact.  However, it established a
parallel system of military tribunals with sole jurisdiction
over certain offenses, such as coup plotting, corruption, armed
robbery, and illegal sale of petroleum.  A 1991 decree amended
Decree One by providing that only sitting or retired civilian
judges may preside over tribunals hearing nonmilitary cases.
The PRC retained the tribunal framework.

In most cases before the tribunals, the accused have the right
to legal counsel, bail, and appeal, though some tribunals
substitute a presumption of guilt for the presumption of
innocence, and conviction rates in the tribunals reportedly
exceed conviction rates in the regular courts.  Sentences are
generally severe.  The Government's reliance on tribunals,
which operate outside the constitutional court system,
seriously undermines the judiciary's independence and often
results in legal proceedings that deny defendants due process.

The Government's frequent refusal to respect court rulings also
undercuts the independence and integrity of the judiciary.  In
November the federal Government circumvented a ruling by the
Kaduna High Court granting Abiola bail by filing an appeal to
the Supreme Court, further calling into question the relevance
of judicial decisions.  The Government ignored court orders in
July requiring that it allow Punch, a daily newspaper closed
down by security forces, to reopen.  In August a federal High
Court ruled the Government in contempt of court for ignoring
the ruling.  The Court declared the closure of the paper
illegal and unconstitutional and ordered the police to vacate
the premises, which they did after an additional 11 days.
Within 2 weeks, the Government shut down Punch by decree.

Seriously damaging the shred of credibility the judiciary
retained, the regime in August declared itself above the law.
Decree 12 of 1994, enacted on August 18, states that "no act of
the federal military government may be questioned henceforth in
a court of law," and "divests all courts of jurisdiction in all
matters concerning the authority of the federal government."
When Attorney General Olu Onagoruwa criticized the decrees as
being unconstitutional, the PRC fired him.

The regular court system is composed of both federal and state
trial courts, state appeals courts, the federal Court of
Appeal, and the federal Supreme Court.  Under the 1979
Constitution, courts of the first instance include magistrate
or district courts, customary or area courts, Shari'a (Islamic)
courts, and for some specified cases, the state high courts.
The nature of the case usually determines which court has
jurisdiction.  In principle, customary and Shari'a courts have
jurisdiction only if both plaintiff and defendant agree to it.
In practice, fear of legal costs, delay, and distance to
alternative courts encourage many litigants to choose these
courts.

Criminal justice procedures call for trial within 3 months of
arraignment for most categories of criminals.  Inefficient
administrative procedures, petty extortion, bureaucratic
inertia, poor communication between police and prison
officials, and inadequate transportation continue to result in
considerable delays, often stretching several years in bringing
suspects to trial.

Trials in the regular court system are public and generally
respect constitutionally protected individual rights, including
a presumption of innocence, the right to be present, to
confront witnesses, to present evidence, and to be represented
by legal counsel.

There are no legal provisions barring women or other groups
from testifying in civil court or giving their testimony less
weight.  The testimony of women is, however, accorded less
weight in Shari'a courts.  There is a widespread perception
that judges are easily bribed, or "settled," and that the
courts cannot be relied upon to render an impartial judgment.
An internal government report submitted to General Abacha in
June, later printed in the press, called the judiciary a
"disaster institution" and recommended that the federal
Government correct the institution's lack of independence and
funding, as well as put an end to corruption and bribery among
judges.

The number of political prisoners (as distinct from political
detainees) held by the Government was also unknown.  At year's
end, M.K.O. Abiola remained in prison, despite a November
ruling by the Kaduna federal High Court of Appeals granting him
bail on the condition that he "not disturb the peace."  The
regime refused to honor the ruling, however, and appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court.  Abiola's trial on treason
charges remained suspended indefinitely on orders from the
regime.  Other long-term political detainees, such as Ken
Saro-Wiwa, continued to be held without trial.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
         Correspondence

Provisions of the 1979 and 1989 Constitutions provide for the
rights to privacy in the home, in correspondence, and in oral
electronic communications.  However, the military Government
regularly interfered in the lives of its citizens, and if the
authorities desired to use a warrant in a particular search
case, they often secured it from a military tribunal rather
than a regular court.  Human rights leaders reported that
security agents regularly followed them and cut or tapped their
organizations' telephones.